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Sherley v. Sebelius:
Who Knew the Term "Research" Could Cause
Such a Ruckus?
Max S. Antony *
I. INTRODUCTION
From heated controversies to unrivaled praise, stem cell research stimu-
lates much discussion among the scientific and political communities as to its
proper place in today's society. However, without federal funding, an over-
whelming majority of stem cell research would not be possible. Sherley v.
Sebelius centers on the plight of two scientists and their efforts to limit distri-
bution of federal funds to research involving only adult stem cells, rather
than human embryonic stem cells (ESCs).1 The court considered whether the
National Institutes of Health (NIH) violated the Dickey-Wicker Amendment
by funding research projects using ESCs.2
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia vacated
the district court's decision to enjoin the NIH from funding research using
ESCs.3 The court concluded that the plaintiffs were unlikely to prevail be-
cause the Dickey-Wicker Amendment's usage of "research" was ambiguous
and the NIH was reasonable in concluding that the Amendment does not
prohibit funding research projects using ESCs.4 However, as the dissenting
judge wrote, the term "research," as used in the Amendment, is not ambigu-
ous. 5 A cursory look at previous case law demonstrates that context is indica-
tive of whether a term's tense applies to the past.6 Here, because the context
clearly indicates applicability to the past tense, the Dickey-Wicker Amend-
ment should bar federal funding for research using ESCs because the process
involves the destruction of embryos.7
* Max S. Antony is a 2013 candidate for a Doctorate of Jurisprudence at SMU
Dedman School of Law.
I. Sherley v. Sebelius (Sherley II), 644 F.3d 388, 389-90 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
2. Id. at 390.
3. Id.
4. Id. (arguing that the Dickey-Wicker Amendment's usage of "research" only
applied to present research and not past).
5. Id. at 400 (Henderson, J., dissenting).
6. See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 331 (1997); Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S.
226, 236 (1964); Abercrombie v. Clarke, 920 F.2d 1351, 1359 (7th Cir. 1990);
Coalition for Clean Air v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 971 F.2d 219, 225 (9th Cir.
1992); see also Guidiville Band of Pomo Indians v. NGV Gaming, Ltd., 531
F.3d 767, 776 (9th Cir. 2008) ("[O]n its own terms the Dictionary Act ... looks
first to 'context,' and only if the 'context' leaves the meaning open to interpre-
tation does the default provision come into play." (quoting Rowland v. Cal.
Men's Colony, 506 U.S. 194, 199-200 (1993))).
7. Sherley II, 644 F.3d at 400, 403 (Henderson, J., dissenting).
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II. FACTS OF THE CASE
Plaintiffs Dr. James Sherley and Dr. Theresa Deisher are scientists who
conduct research exclusively using adult stem cells.8 "Adult stem cells can be
found in the various tissues and organs of the human body."9 On the other
hand, ESCs are "found only in ... human embryo[s]."o Isolating an ESC
requires the removal of its inner cell mass; thereby destroying the embryo.II
Subsequently, the stem cells harvested from the inner cell mass are placed in
a culture, where they continuously divide without differentiation and create a
"stem cell line of identical cells."12 An individual ESC can be separated with
minimal risk of disruption to the multiplication process or durability of the
line.13 The removed cell may then be used in further research.14 Either way,
the ESC will be manipulated and developed into a specific type of cell appro-
priate to the specific research."15
In 1996, Congress passed the Dickey-Wicker Amendment, which pro-
hibited the NIH from funding:
(1) the creation of a human embryo or embryos for research purposes;
or (2) research in which a human embryo or embryos are destroyed, dis-
carded, or knowingly subjected to risk of injury or death greater than that
allowed for research on fetuses in utero under 45 C.F.R. 46.204(b) and sec-
tion 498(b) of the Public Health Service Act.16
In 1999, the General Counsel of the United States Department of Health
and Human Services issued a memorandum concluding that the Dickey-
Wicker Amendment "permit[ted] federal funding of research using ESCs ...
because ESCs are not embryos."l7 In 2009, President Obama signed an Exec-
utive Order permitting the NIH to support human ESC research, within the
8. Id. at 390 (majority opinion).
9. Id.; What Are Adult Stem Cells?, NAT'L INSTS. OF HEALTH: STEM CELL INFO.,
http://stemcells.nih.gov/info/basics/basics4.aspx (June 7, 2012).





15. Sherley II, 644 F.3d at 390.
16. Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-117, 123 Stat 3034,
§ 509(a)(2) (2010); see also Jack T. Mosher, Viewpoint: Injunction Junction:
Where Stem Cell Research and Politics Collide, AAMC REP. (2011), available
at http://www.aamc.org/newsroom/reporter/170170/viewpoint.html (NIH funds
more stem cell research than any other organization-private or public).
17. Sherley II, 644 F.3d at 391.
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boundaries of the law.18 The NIH then issued the 2009 Guidelines, which
state that "funding of the derivation of stem cells from human embryos is
prohibited by . . . the Dickey-Wicker Amendment."19 In addition, the Guide-
lines further addressed the Amendment as follows:
Since 1999, the Department of Health and Human Services
(HHS) has consistently interpreted [Dickey-Wicker] as not appli-
cable to research using [ESCs], because [ESCs] are not embryos
as defined by Section 509. This longstanding interpretation has
been left unchanged by Congress, which has annually reenacted
the Dickey[-Wicker] Amendment with full knowledge that HHS
has been funding [ESC] research since 2001. These guidelines
therefore recognize the distinction, accepted by the Congress, be-
tween the derivation of stem cells from an embryo that results in
the embryo's destruction, for which Federal funding is prohibited,
and research involving [ESCs] that does not involve an embryo
nor result in an embryo's destruction, for which Federal funding is
permitted.20
Following the issuance of the Guidelines, Congress reenacted the
Dickey-Wicker Amendment.21
III. DESCRIPTION OF PLAINTIFFS' CLAIM
The plaintiffs filed this lawsuit in the United States District Court for
the District of Columbia and moved for a preliminary injunction to prevent
the NIH from funding research using ESCs.22 The plaintiffs argued that the
Dickey-Wicker Amendment clearly barred federal funding for projects using
ESCs. Since, by definition, ESCs are produced through the destruction of
embryos, any subsequent use of the ESCs was research that "result[ed] in an
embryo's destruction.23 Further, the plaintiffs advocated that the court inter-
pret the term "research" broadly because Congress would have undoubtedly
been more specific, analogous to subsection (1) of the Dickey-Wicker
Amendment, if a narrow reading was intended.24 Further, the plaintiffs ar-
18. Removing Barriers to Responsible Scientific Research Involving Human Stem
Cells, Exec. Order No. 13,505, 74 Fed. Reg. 10,667 (Mar. 9, 2009).
19. Sherley II, 644 F.3d at 391 (quoting National Institutes of Health Guidelines for
Human Stem Cell Research, 74 Fed. Reg. 32,170-02, at 32,175 (July 7, 2009)).
20. Sherley II, 644 F.3d at 391 (quoting National Institutes of Health Guidelines for
Human Stem Cell Research, 74 Fed. Reg. at 32,173).
21. Sherley II, 644 F.3d at 392.
22. Id. at 389.
23. Id. at 393-94.
24. Id. (Subsection (1) specifically "bars the 'creation' of an embryo for research
purposes").
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gued that the NIH was not entitled to Chevron25 deference because no inter-
pretation of the term "research" was offered.26 Moreover, the NIH's reading
of the Dickey-Wicker Amendment was unreasonable because the NIH inter-
preted "research" to encompass embryonic cell derivation, which should only
be deemed "research" if it is part of a larger project.27
IV. PROCEDURAL AND SUBSTANTIVE HISTORY
The Government's motion to dismiss was granted by the district court
for want of standing.28 The plaintiffs appealed, and the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit ruled that plaintiffs had standing
because they compete with ESC researchers for funding.29 On remand, the
district court issued the preliminary injunction sought by the plaintiffs that
prohibited defendants from funding research involving ESCs.30
V. UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
The circuit court disagreed with the district court's decision and vacated
the preliminary injunction.31 The court held that the NIH's interpretation of
the Dickey-Wicker Amendment was entitled to Chevron deference, and that
the balance of equities tilted away from granting a preliminary injunction.32
The plaintiffs were unlikely to succeed due to the ambiguity of the Dickey-
Wicker Amendment and the reasonableness of the NIH's determination that
funding research project using ESCs was not prohibited.33
VI. COURT'S RATIONALE
The court began its analysis by looking at the first factor a plaintiff must
show in an action for a preliminary injunction-likelihood of success on the
25. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43
(1984).
26. Sherley II, 644 F.3d at 395.
27. Id. (analyzing under Chevron).
28. Id. at 392.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 390.
32. Sherley II, 644 F.3d at 388, 390, 399 ("'A plaintiff seeking a preliminary in-
junction must establish [1] that he is likely to succeed on the merits, [2] that he
is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, [3] that
the balance of equities tips in his favor, and [4] that an injunction is in the
public interest.'" (quoting Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S.
7, 20 (2008))).
33. Id. at 390.
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merits.34 The court then approached this issue under the two-step Chevron
framework.35 Under the framework, "[i]f ... Congress has directly spoken to
the precise question at issue, then [a court] must give effect to the unambigu-
ous expressed intent of Congress."36 If the "statute is silent or ambiguous
with respect to the issue, then [a court] must defer to the administering
agency's interpretation as long as it reflects a permissible construction of the
statute."37
Under the first step of its Chevron analysis, the court agreed that the text
of the Dickey-Wicker Amendment was not an "unambiguous ban on research
using [ESCs]" because it was present tense and addressed research where
embryos "are" destroyed; not research where embryos "were" destroyed.38
The court reasoned that "[Lt]he use of the present tense in a statute strongly
suggests it does not extend to past actions."39 As evidence, the court looked
to the Dictionary Act; it provided that "unless the context indicates other-
wise . . . words used in the present tense include the future, as well as the
present."40 The court also gave great weight to the Supreme Court's interpre-
tation to mean "the present tense generally does not include the past."41 Be-
cause there was no indication of a different interpretation of "research," and
because "the definition of research is flexible enough to describe either a
discrete project or an extended process," the court found the text of the
Dickey-Wicker Amendment to be ambiguous.42
Under the second step of Chevron, the NIH's interpretation of the
Dickey-Wicker Amendment was found to be reasonable.43 Contrary to the
plaintiffs' argument, the court found that the NIH made clear that "research
involving ESCs does not necessarily include the antecedent process of deriv-
ing the cells" because the NIH's Guidelines distinguished the derivation of
ESCs from "research involving ESCs that does not involve an embryo nor
result in an embryo's destruction."44 While the Government admitted that
34. Id. at 393.
35. Id. (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43).
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Sherley II, 644 F.3d. at 393-94.
39. Id. at 394.
40. Id. (quoting I U.S.C. § 1).
41. Id. (quoting Carr v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2229, 2236 (2010)).
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Sherley II, 644 F.3d at 395 (quoting National Institutes of Health Guidelines for
Human Stem Cell Research, 74 Fed. Reg. at 32,173).
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"derivation is research," the court debated "whether the act of derivation, by
itself, comes within a standard definition of research."45
Because the statute was imprecisely worded, the court broadened its fo-
cus. 4 6 It concluded that Congress "wrote with particularity" and the statute
uses the present tense "in which" and "are," as opposed to the past tense "for
which" and "were"; therefore, it was entirely reasonable for the NIH to un-
derstand the amendment as permitting funding for ESC research.47 Further
supporting the reasonableness of the NIH's interpretation, Congress "has re-
enacted Dickey-Wicker unchanged year after year with full knowledge that
HHS has been funding [ESC] research since 2001."48
The plaintiffs then presented their challenges to the validity of the
Guidelines; however, these were quickly dismissed because the plaintiffs
could not establish that there were no "circumstances exist[ing] under which
the Guidelines would be valid."49 The plaintiffs then argued that the Guide-
lines "transgress the prohibition in Dickey-Wicker against research in which
a human embryo or embryos are . .. knowingly subjected to risk of injury or
death."50 The court found no merit in the plaintiffs' argument because it re-
lied on the idea that ESC research "creat[es] demand for human embryonic
stem cells, which necessitate[s] the destruction of embryos."51 Furthermore,
because the district court did not address this theory, the D.C. Circuit chose
to ignore such arguments.52
The court then attempted to "balance the equities" and determine
whether the three other factors for granting a preliminary injunction "favor
the plaintiffs [so much] that they need only have raised a 'serious legal ques-
tion' on the merits."53 The court reasoned that the plaintiffs, at a minimum,
"raised a 'serious legal [challenge]' on the merits."54 However, the court was
not satisfied that plaintiffs "compete with ESC researchers for funding," and
45. Id. at 396 (internal quotation marks omitted). The plaintiffs argue that "because
the standard definition of 'research' requires some kind of scientific inquiry,
and deriving ESCs, standing alone, involves no such inquiry, then the act of
derivation can be deemed 'research' only if it is part of a larger project." Id. at
395.
46. Id. at 396.
47. Id.
48. Id. (quoting National Institutes of Health Guidelines for Human Stem Cell Re-
search, 74 Fed. Reg. at 32,173).
49. Sherley II, 644 F.3d at 397 (quoting Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 301 (1993)).
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 398.
53. Id.; see also Wash. Metro. Area Transit Comm'n v. Holiday Tours, Inc., 559
F.2d 841, 843 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
54. Sherley II, 644 F.3d at 398.
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held that the plaintiffs failed to prove they would prevail on the merits of the
case.55 The court mentioned that the plaintiffs have been competing for fund-
ing since 2001 and "it is necessarily uncertain whether invalidating the
Guidelines would result in the plaintiffs getting any more grant money from
the NIH."56
Instead, the court found that the hardship placed on ESC researchers
would be "certain and substantial."57 An injunction would preclude the NIH
from funding worthy ESC projects and "bar further disbursements to ESC
researchers who have already begun multi-year projects in reliance upon a
grant from the NIH."58 As a result, the court decided that it did not need to
evaluate the other two factors because the balancing of irreparable harm did
not tip in the favor of the plaintiffs.59
VII. CRITIQUE
While the majority opinion makes a few good points, I strongly side
with the dissenting opinion in this case and firmly believe the plaintiffs
would be able to succeed on the merits.60 The majority obliviously butchered
the laws of statutory construction.61 As Judge Henderson points out, the ma-
jority opinion "produced a result that would make Rube Goldberg tip his hat"
and essentially accomplished "linguistic jujitsu," so as to shape an interpreta-
tion the majority thought best.62 And in this instance, the majority thought it
best to manipulate the term "research" in such a way to justify their decision
instead of tailoring a decision in congruence with their findings.
First, evaluating whether ESC research is "research in which a human
embryo or embryos are destroyed," begins by "determining the meaning of
research."63 The dictionary defines "research" as "'diligent and systemic in-
quiry or investigation into a subject in order to discover or revise facts, theo-
ries, applications, etc."64 Thus, research includes "systematic inquiry or
investigation."65 Further, "systematic" is another word for sequenced ac-
55. Id. at 398-99 (holding that the balancing of equities did not tilt in the plaintiffs'
favor).
56. Id. at 398.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 398-99.
59. Id. at 399.
60. See Sherley II, 644 F.3d at 399-406 (Henderson, J., dissenting).
61. See id. at 399 (citing majority opinion at 391, 396).
62. Id.
63. Id. at 400.
64. Sherley v. Sebelius (Sherley 1), 704 F. Supp. 2d 63, 70 (D.C. Cir. 2010)).
65. Id.
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tion.66 As a result, "[tihe first sequence of ESC research is the derivation of
stem cells from the human embryo. . . [which] destroys the embryo and
therefore cannot be federally funded."67 Similarly, as advocated by Judge
Henderson, the succeeding steps of ESC research should be "banned by the
[Dickey-Wicker] Amendment because . . . they continue the systematic in-
quiry or investigation."68
Moreover, one must assume that Congress considered ESC research
when it enacted the Dickey-Wicker Amendment in 1996.69 Although the
amendment prohibits federal funding for the "creation of a human em-
bryo . .. for research purposes," it does not use similar language with respect
to the destruction of embryos.70 Thus, research must be the explicit "target of
the ban Congress imposed [on] the destruction of a human embryo."7' As a
result, analysis should stop at the first step under Chevron "[b]ecause the
meaning of research is plain, and the intent of the Congress to ban the federal
funding of ESC research is equally plain."72
However, in the event uncertainty exists regarding the extent of the
Dickey-Wicker Amendment's ban, Judge Henderson notes that it could be
remedied by reading the Dickey-Wicker Amendment in full.73 Such a reading
reveals that Congress unambiguously intended that the term "research" is to
have same meaning as "research" found in Section 46.204(b).74 Research, in
that context, means "a systematic investigation, including research develop-
ment, testing, and evaluation, designed to develop and contribute to general-
izable knowledge."75 Further, if the same term is used throughout a statute, it
is presumed to have the same meaning; which is exactly the situation here.76
The government's interpretation of the Dickey-Wicker Amendment to
be present- and future-looking, rather than past-looking, is in contrast with
the context of the amendment.77 The context necessitates that "research" not
66. Sherley II, 644 F.3d at 401 (citation omitted).
67. Id. at 400.
68. Id. at 401.
69. Id.
70. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
71. Id.
72. Sherley II, 644 F.3d at 401.
73. Id. ("[Rlesearch in which a human embryo or embryos are destroyed, dis-
carded, or knowingly subjected to risk of injury or death greater than that al-
lowed for research on fetuses in utero under 45 C.F.R. 46.204(b) and section
498(b) of the Public Health Service Act" is not permitted.).
74. Id. at 402.
75. Id. at 401-02 (quoting 45 C.F.R. § 46.102(d)).
76. Id. (citing Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 118).
77. Id. at 403-04.
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be treated as "free-standing pieces," with only one piece being banned while
the other pieces remained undisturbed. 78 This technical twisting reinforces
the notion that the majority was performing linguistic acrobatics in order to
catch a glimpse of justification for their decision.
In addition, the majority was wrong to downplay the irreparable harm
the plaintiffs have suffered; NIH funding is highly competitive, and provides
the largest amount of funding for stem cell research.79 It is of no consequence
that a disruption may occur in ongoing ESC research projects that have been
funded or will receive funding in the future.o As the dissent adequately de-
scribes, two scientists should have been successful, because they made an
incredibly "strong showing of likelihood of success on the merits."81
VIII. CONCLUSION
In summary, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Co-
lumbia Circuit's holding in Sherley halted the scientists' efforts to simply
enforce the long standing Dickey-Wicker Amendment and ban funding for
(essentially) the destruction of human embryos. The majority's decision cre-
ates a slippery slope, not only for statutory interpretation, but also for other
issues, including abortion. Determining where to draw the proverbial line in
the sand has been a staple in the United States' legal history. Sadly, the line
in Sherley was drawn in the wrong location.
78. Sherley II, 644 F.3d at 403-04.
79. Id. at 405; Mosher, supra note 18.
80. Sherley II, 644 F.3d at 405.
81. Id. at 406 ("If the movant makes an usually strong showing on one of the
factors, then it does not necessarily have to make a strong a showing on another
factor." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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